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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

DEATH AS A JURISDICTIONAL FACT BEFORE THE REGISTER OF
WILLS AND THE ORPHANS' COURT IN PENNSYLVANIA
by
A. J. White Hutton*
The primary point of contact in the administration of the estates of the dead in
Pennsylvania is with the office of the Register of Wills. This ancient office has
jurisdiction (a) in the probate of wills; (b) in the issuance of letters testamentary
and of administration; (c) in the receipt and advertising of accounts of fiduciaries;
and (d) in the collection of death transfer taxes.'
On the other hand the Orphans' Court is the immediate court of appeal from
the decrees and orders of the Register of Wills and is also the court having juris2
diction of the estates of the dead.
The jurisdiction of the Register of Wills and of the Orphans' Court is based
fundamentally upon two hypotheses, (1) the death of an individual, and (2) property of which such individual was the owner.
In the present outline the learning relative to the first hypothesis will be discussed. This essential was emphasized as early as 1824 by Duncan, J. in McPherson
v. Cunliff, wherein he declared: 8
"The matter which gives the Orphans' Court jurisdiction, is the death
of the owner, intestate, for if administration were taken out on the effects
of a living man, or one who died testate, the administration itself would
be void, and there could be no administrator to act, no party before the
court, consequently, all the proceedings would be null."
Devlin v. Commonwealth
Over a half century passed after the utterance of Duncan, J. in McPherson v.
Cunliff, supra, before the attention of the profession to the significance of death as
a jurisdictional fact on which to found any action by the register's office and the
orphans' court was given emphasis in the case designated in this topic. The action
was debt upon a case stated, agreed upon by the parties and submitted to the court,
setting forth the following facts:
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of Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 415, 20 P.S. 1842, ef seq.
Court Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 363, 20 P.S. 2082, et seq.
R. 422 (Pa. 1824). Error to C. P., Allegheny County.
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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Peter D. Devlin died intestate, in 1866, seized of certain real estate which was
partitioned at No. 3, September Term, 1867, John F. Devlin, the eldest son of the
decedent, taking the said real estate at the appraisement, and entering into recognizance for payment of the distributive shares. After settlement of the debts, the
balance of the fund arising from the realty was distributed under the intestate law
of Pennsylvania, amongst the several heirs at law of Peter D. Devlin. On said distribution, James Devlin, one of the sons of the said decedent, being dead, his share
was allotted to his three children: James P., Martha and Mary B. Devlin. Their respective portions of said shares were paid to James and Martha, and said Mary
having been absent and unheard-from for more than seven years, upon the presumption of her death, letters of administration on her estate were granted to her
brother, James P. Devlin, and payment of her portion of said share made to him,
as such administrator.
This action is brought by Mary B. Devlin, who-was erroneously supposed to
be dead, against John F. Devlin the cognizor, and Joseph F. Devlin, his surety, to
recover her portion of said distributive share, which, with the interest accrued thereon, now amounts to the sum of $880.39, and the defendants set up payments to said
administrator in bar of the action.
If, on the above facts, the court should be of opinion that the defendants are
liable, they will enter judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $880.39, with interest
thereon, from February 8th, 1882, and if the court should be of opinion that the
defendants are not liable they shall enter judgment in favor of the defendants,
with cost of suit. Both parties, plaintiff and defendants, expressly reserve their right
to a writ of error.
The court, in an opinion filed by Ewing, P.J., entered judgment for the plaintiff on the case stated, whereupon the defendant took this writ of error, assigning
for error the said judgment.
In affirming the judgment of the court below Gordon, J., observed:
"Notwithstanding the long absence of Mary B. Devlin, the plaintiff
below, from the state of Pennsylvania, and although it may be, as alleged
in the statement of the plaintiffs in error, that she had been unheard-of for
a period of fifteen years prior to the date of the issuing of letters of administration on her estate, yet the fact turns out to be that at that time
she was alive. It follows, that those who undertook to act upon the presumption of her death must bear the consequences of the failure of the
presumption.
"We cannot, therefore, but approve of what was so well said by the
learned judge of the court below, i.e., that the presumption interposed
by the defendants to defeat the plaintiff's recovery was not even an important element in the case; it was but evidence from which the register
might assume the death of Mary B. Devlin. but it was no more conclusive than would have been the testimony of false witnesses to prove the
same thing.
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"That this granting of letters upon the estate of a living person, though
supposed to be dead, is not a voidable but a void act, is a legal conclusion
supported by abundant authority." 6
Scott v. McNeda
This was an action of ejectment brought January 14, 1892, in the Superior
Court of Thurston County, State of Washington, by Moses H. Scott against John
McNeal and Augustine McNeal to recover possession of a tract of land in that
county. It was conceded that title to the land was in the plaintiff until 1888. Defendants however denied plaintiff's title and claimed title in themselves under a
deed from an administrator of the plaintiff's estate, and in their answer alleged
that in March, 1881, plaintiff mysteriously disappeared from his place of abode
and without the knowledge of those with whom he had been accustomed to associate and remained continuously away until July, 1891, and was generally believed
by. his former associates to be dead, and at the trial the following facts, inter alia,
were proved: that on April 2, 1888, a petition was presented to the probate court of
Thurston County, in the Territory of Washington, praying for the appointment
of an administrator on the estate of Moses H. Scott who had disappeared in the
month of March, 1881. In accordance with the law the petition was posted in three
public places signed by the probate judge with notice that a hearing and consideration of said petition had been fixed for Friday, April 20, 1888, at 10 o'clock A. M.,
at the office of the probate judge. Later this hearing was held and an administrator
was appointed together with a guardian ad litem for certain minor children, and
on July 16, 1888, the probate court, on the petition of the administrator and after
the usual notice and with the consent of the guardian ad litem, made an order
authorizing the administrator to sell all of the decedent's real estate. The same was
duly sold at public auction and the probate court confirmed the sale, and the land
was conveyed to one Ward and the purchase money paid to the administrator, who
applied the same to the payment of a dedt to Scott which was secured by mortgage
on the land. On November 26, 1889, Ward conveyed by warranty deed to the defendants who forthwith entered into possession and made valuable improvements
thereon. Later the plaintiff returned and instituted this ejectment. The judgment
of the Superior Court was entered for the defendants and this judgment on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State was affirmed. The present writ of error was sued
out by the plaintiff based on his contention that said judgment deprived him of his
property without due process of law and was contrary to the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States.
Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the Court reversing the judgment
of the state court and remanding the case for further proceedings not inconsistent

with the opinion as filed.
5 At this point the learned court discussed McPherson v. Cunliff, supra; the English case of
Allen 1. Dundas, 3 Duraf. and East, Term R. 129, 130; Gliffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch 23, per Mar-

shall, C. J. and the Mass. case of Jodiunsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 3 Allen 87, all in point; and
distinguished Miller v. Beates, 5 S. & P. 490 (Pa. 1817).
6 154 U.S. 34 (May 14, 1894), 14 Sup. Ct. 1108; 38 Law. Ed. 896, reversing 5 Wash. 309,
31 Par. 873.
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The opening paragraphs of the opinion are as follows:
"The plaintiff formerly owned the land in question, and still owns it,
unless he has been deprived of it by a sale and conveyance, under order
of the probate court of the county of Thurston and territory of Washington, by an administrator of his estate, appointed by the court on April 20,
upon a petition filed April 2, 1888.
"The form of the order appointing the administrator is peculiar. By
that order, after reciting that the plaintiff disappeared more than seven
years before, and had not since been seen or heard of by his relatives and
acquaintances, and that the circumstances at and immediately after the
time when he was last seen, about eight years ago, were such as to give
them the belief that he was murdered about that time, the probate court
finds that he 'is dead to all legal intents and purposes, having died on or
about March 25, 1888;' that is to say, not at the time of his supposed
murder, seven or eight years before, but within a month before the filing
of the petition for administration. The order also, after directing that
Milroy be appointed administrator, purports to direct that 'letters of
guardianship issue to him upon his giving bond; but this was evidently
2 clerical error in the order or in the record, for it appears that he received
letters of administration and qualified under them.
"The fundamental question in the case is whether letters of administration upon the estate of a person who is in fact alive have any validity or
effect as against him.
"By the law of England and America, before the Declaration of Independence, and for almost a century afterwards, the absolute nullity of such
letters was treated as beyond dispute."
After referring to certain cases discussed in McPherson v. Contiff, sapra,1 the
learned justice observed:
"The same doctrine has been affirmed by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in a series of cases beginning 70 years ago. McPherson v. Cuntiff (1824) 11 Serg. & R. 422, 430; Peebles' Appeal (1826) 15 Serg. &
R. 39, 42; Devlin v. Com. (1882) 101 Pa. St. 273. In the last of those
cases, it was held that a grant of letters of administration upon the estate
of a person who, having been absent and unheard from for 15 years, was
presumed to be dead, but who, as it afterwards appeared, was in fact alive,
was absolutely void, and might be impeached collaterally."
Referring to the 14th Amendment and due process of law and cases thereunder, it was further observed:
"No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without
jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party."
Discussing particularly the Washington probate statute which was in the
general form of probate law applying to deceased persons, it was stated:
"Under such a statute, according to the overwhelming weight of authority, as shown by the cases cited in the earlier part of this opinion, the
7 See note .
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jurisdiction of the court to which is committed the control and management of the estates of deceased persons, by whatever name it is called,ecclesiastical court, probate court, orphans' court or court of the ordinary
or the surrogate,-does not exist or take effect before death. All proceedings of such courts in the probate of wills and the granting of administrations depend upon the fact that a person is dead, and are null and void if
he is alive. Their jurisdiction in this respect being limited to the estates
of deceased persons, they have no jurisdiction whatever to administer and
dispose of the estates of living persons of full age and sound mind, or to
determine that a living man is dead, and thereupon undertake to dispose
of his estate."
"A court of probate must, indeed, inquire into and be satisfied of the
fact of the death of the person whose will is sought to be proved or whose
estate is sought to be administered, because, without that fact, the court
has no jurisdiction over his estate; and not because its decision upon the
question, whether he is living or dead, can in any wise bind or estop him,
or deprive him, while alive, of the title or control of his property.
"As the jurisdiction to issue letters of administration upon his estate
rests upon the fact of his death, so the notice given before issuing such
letters assumes that fact, and is addressed, not to him, but to those who
after his death may be interested in his estate, as next of kin, legatees,
creditors, or otherwise. Notice to them cannot be notice to him, because
all their interests are adverse to his. The whole thing, so far as he is concerned, is res inter alios acta."
The final statement in the opinion concludes as follows:
"The defendants did not rely upon any statute of limitations, nor upon
any statute allowing them for improvements made in good faith; but their
sole reliance was upon a deed from an administrator, acting under the
orders of a court which had no jurisdiction to appoint him or to confer
any authority upon him, as against the plaintiff."
Act of June 24, 1885 s
Devlin v. The Commonwealth, supra,9 was the incentive to the passage of
the Act of 1885. The Devlin case held that where letters of administration were
issued by the Register of Wills the fact of death being based upon the presumption
after seven years unexplained absence, and the presumption was later rebutted by
the return of the presumed decedent, all proceedings based upon the letters as issued
were null and void. The rationale was that the register's office and the orphans'
court were established by statutes which in turn were based upon the actuality of
death of the owner of the property which was to be administered. Hence, if this
fundamental fact was not actually present, the register and the orphans' court were
lacking in jurisdiction. This deduction was quite plain for in Pennsylvania the
register of wills and the orphans' court are statutory creations and have no common
8 P.L. 155; the Act of May 28, 1913, P.L. 369; the Supplementary Act of May 28, 1913, P.L.
373; the Act of June 11, 1915, P.L. 945. Later all legislation was combined in Section 6 of the
Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 447.

9 See note 4.
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law jurisdiction. The Act of 1885 was therefore passed to specifically confer upon
the orphans' court the required jurisdiction in cases where the fact of death was
based upon the presumption of death and also to confer upon the register of wills
the specific authority to grant letters where the orphans' court so found the fact
of death. A reading of the statutes already cited makes this matter quite plain.
Scott v. McNeal, surpra,1 was decided May 14, 1894 by the Supreme Court
of the United States on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington and subsequent to our enabling act of 1885.
However, the facts were somewhat similar to those of the Devlin case and
the reasoning of the court was the same. In the Devlin case the sum of money involved was paid voluntarily by the principal on the partition bond. If he had compelled payment by requiring legal action on the bond he would have been protected as
will be pointed out later in this discussion. In Scott v. McNeal the defendants were
the successors in title from the purchaser who derived his title from the administrator
of the presumed decedent. If in this case the title had rested upon proceedings on
the mortgage, which was a lien upon the real estate apparently created by the presumed decedent himself, the result again would have been different. In other words
in both of these latter suppositions the respective courts would obviously have had
jurisdiction whether the owner of the res was living or dead.
However, as it happened in both cases, the probate action was based upon
statutes which in turn were based upon the actuality of death of the owner of the
property to be administered. Therefore, in both sets of facts the respective courts
were confronted with the question whether per se probate courts were vested with
jurisdiction to administer upon the estates of persons who were not actually dead,
sad both courts answered in the negative.
1
Cannius v. Reading School District"
Fourteen years, almost to the day, elapsed from the passage of the Act of 1885
until its constitutionality came into question. In the case now under consideration
the facts as presented to the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County and recited
by W. D. Porter, J., in the opinion of the Superior Court were as follows:
"The defendant was the owner of certain land which was subject to a
right of dower of the plaintiff, the value of which dower right had been
ascertained and the amount of the annual installments to be paid duly
fixed. The installments had been paid down to and including that for the
year 1888, to which time the domicile of the plaintiff had been in the city
of Reading, in the state of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, in the year 1888,
left the state of Pennsylvania and nothing was seen or heard of her until
the bringing of this action, in 1899. The only son of the plaintiff continued to reside at Reading and, on May 17, 1897, presented his petition
to the register of wills, praying that letters of administration upon the
estate of his mother, the plaintiff, be issued to him, The ground upon
10 See note 6.
11 21 Pa. Super. 340 (1902); 206 Pa. 469, 56 A. 16 (1903); 25 Sup. Ct. 721, 98 Am. St.
Rep. 790, 118 U.S. 456.
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which the petition for administration was founded being the presumption
of the death of the plaintiff, on account of her absence for more than
seven years from the place of her last domicile in this commonwealth,
the application was by the register certified to the orphans' court of the
county, and the subsequent proceedings were conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Actof June 24, 1885, P.L. 155, entitled, 'An act
relating to the granting of letters of administration upon the estates of
persons presumed to be dead by reason of long absence from their former
domicile.' The court after a hearing decreed that the legal presumption of
death was established by the evidence. After notice by publication, in accordance with the requirements of the statute, letters of administration
upon the estate of Margaret Cunnius were, on January 29, 1898, granted
to John S. Gallagher. The defendant paid to this administrator all the installments upon the dower charge, and received from him an absolute
release of the dower right. The plaintiff, on June 30, 1899, brought the
action to recover the annual installments accruing from her statutory right
of dower after the last payment to her, in 1888. The defendant relied
upon the provisions of the act of June 24, 1885, the decree of the orphans'
court made under the jurisdiction supposed to be conferred by the act, and
the payment to the administrator made in accordance with the statutory
provisions. The plaintiff, under the objection of the defendant that the
decree of the orphans' court could not be attacked collaterally, proved that
she was still living, that in the year 1888 she had acquired a domicile in
the city of Sacramento, in the state of California, and had there resided
ever since that time."
The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by the
Superior Court. Whereupon the Supreme Court allowed an appeal, 12 reversing the
Superior Court and ordering the record remitted to the Court of Common Pleas
with directions to enter judgment for the defendant n.o.v., Mitchell, J., inter alia,

explaining:
"The Superior Court held the act unconstitutional as depriving the
plaintiff of her property without due process of law, under the fourteenth
amendment of the constitution of the United States. In so holding the
court felt itself bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34.* If that case really governs the
present we must, of course, render willing obedience to its supreme authority. But we do not so regard it. The exact point there decided was that a
sale by an administrator appointed under a state law for a person who had
alive, passed
but who
was of
in the
fact decision
been absent, unheard of, for seven years, The
was
ground
no title even to an innocent purchaser.
that the probate court had no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator for
a person who was alive, and there being no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, the appointment of an administrator and all the acts done under
such appointment were void. This is in entire accord with our own decision in Devlin v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 273, which is cited approvingly by Mr. Justice Gray in his opinion.....
"But-our act of 1885 is wholly different in intent and effect. It was
passed less than three years after the decision in Devlin v. Commonwealth
12 206 Pa. 469,

56 A. 16, 98 Am, St. Rep. 790 (1903).
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and is an effort to supply the remedy that such a state of facts as the present requires. Its primary purpose as appears from the preceding summary
of its provisions, is not distribution, but conservation of the estate, through
the medium of an officer clothed with authority to protect and enforce
the rights of the unknown owner, the absentee if alive, his legal successors
if he be dead. The statute did not create the presumption of death, that
we inherited with our common law. The probate court in Pennsylvania,
in the sense in which it is understood in the cases previously referred to, is,
for ordinary cases, the register of wills whose jurisdiction as held in Devlin v. Commonwealth depends on the fact of death. But when a case arises
of presumption of death from absence, a question of fact is presented,
which is essential to the determination of the rights in property whose
owner is thus shown to be doubtful. Express jurisdiction is given by the
act of 1885 to the Orphans' Court to inquire into and determine judicially
that fact. This provision at once takes the case out of the ruling in Scott v.
MciNeal, and the line of authorities on the same principle, and puts it in
the class of Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 125, where payment to the executor
was a judicial act by a competent tribunal within its jurisdiction and
though incorrect in fact, as subsequently shown, it was valid until regularly rescinded or reversed, and could not be attacked collaterally. The objection therefore that the court in the present case was without jurisdiction
over the subject cannot be sustained."
In short our Supreme Court held that the Act of 1885 was constitutional,
that under its terms the orphans' court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and
lastly that the procedure satisfied the requirement of due process under the fourteenth Amendment.
The following quotation from the opinion of Mitchell, J., is interesting as
reflecting the view of the writer generally as to the power of the Commonwealth
in such type of cases:
"One other consideration is applicable to the present case. The plaintiff was a citizen and resident of this state. She chose to disappear, leaving
no trace for eleven years. She was bound to know the law. The state has
power to make rules of property, and all owners are bound to conform
and abide by them. It might treat absence for seven years as ipso facto an
abandonment, and deal with it accordingly. The plaintiff legally knew
that if she stayed away twenty-one years the statute of limitations would
bar her claim against the defendant, and the reasons for her absence whatever they were would not stop that result; the act of 1885 was in force
when she went away and she was equally bound to know that under its
provisions the presumption of death might be established and acted upon.
By staying away she should be held to have accepted the provisions ofthe
act as a sufficient protection to her rights."
In the conservation of property the case is an example of the valid exercise
of the police power.1"
18 Cf. Commonwealth v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 138, 102 A. 569 (1917); Germantown
Tr. Co. v. Powell, 265 Pa. 71, 108 A. 441 (1919); Appeal of Comm., 322 Pa. 481, 186 A. 600

(1936); In re Phila. Elect. Co., 352 Pa. 457, 43 A. 2d 116 (1945); In re Millar's Est., 356 Pa.

56, 51 A. 2d 745 (1947).
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The judgment of our Supreme Court was later affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the United States, Mr. Justice White delivering the opinion in which after reviewing the facts and differentiating the same from that of Scott v. McNeaJ, supra,14
referring to the points pressed on behalf of the plaintiff in error, he said:
"We shall consider these objections separately:
1st. Was the state statute providing for the administration of the property of an absentee under the circumstances contemplated by the statute so
beyond the scope of the state's authority as to constitute a want of due
process of law within the intendment of the 14th Amendment? That the
amendment does not deprive the states of their police power over subjects
within their jurisdiction is elementary. The question, then, is not the wisdom of the statute, but whether it was so beyond the scope of municipal
government as to amount to a want of due process of law. The solution
of this inquiry leads us, therefore, to consider the general power of government to provide for the administration of the estates of absentees under
the conditions enumerated in the Pennsylvania law."
The answer to this proposition as made by the learned justice was in the
negative by tracing the general trend of law in this country, after which he concluded as follows:
"As the preceding statement shows that the right to regulate the estate of absentees, both in the common and civil law, has ever been recognized as being within the scope of governmental authority, it must follow
that the proposition that the state of Pennsylvania was wholly without
power to legislate concerning the property of an absentee is without merit,
unless it be that the authority of a state over the subject is restrained by
some constitutional limitation. That the Constitution of Pennsylvania does
not put such a restriction is foreclosed by the decision of the supreme court
of Pennsylvania in this case. But it is insisted, conceding that the state of
Pennsylvania has power to provide for the administration of the property
of an absentee, yet that authority could not be exerted without violating
the due process clause of the 14th Amendment if the administrative proceeding, brought into play under the exercise of the authority, is made
binding upon the absentee if it should subsequently develop that he was
alive when the administration was initiated, To sustain this proposition
numerous decisions of state courts of last resort are relied upon, which are
enumerated in the margin, and special reliance is placed upon the decision
of this court in Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 41, 38 L. ed. 896, 900, 14
Sup. Ct. Rep. 1108. We are of opinion, however, that the cases relied
upon, with one or two exceptions, hereafter to be noticed, are inapposite
to this case. The leading cases were reviewed in Scott v. McNeal, and their
inapplicability to the present case will therefore be demonstrated by a
brief consideration of Scott v. McNeal."
After distinguishing Scott v. McNeal from the present case the opinion continues:
"As it cannot be denied that, in substance, the Pennsylvania statute is
a special proceeding for the administration of the estates of absentees, dis14 See notes 6 and 10.
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tinct from the general law of that state providing for the settlement of the
estates of deceased persons, and as, by the express terms of the statute,
jurisdiction was conferred upon the proper court to grant the administration, it follows that the supreme court of Pennsylvania did not deprive the
plaintiff in error of due process of law within the intendment of the 14th
Amendment.
"2nd. It remains only to consider the contention that even although
there was power to enact the statute, it is nevertheless repugnant to the
14h Amendment, because it fails to provide notice as a prerequisite to the
administration which the statute authorizes, and because of the absence
from the statute of essential safeguards for the protection of the property
of the absentee which is to be administered. Let it be conceded, as we think
it must be, that the creation by a state law of an arbitrary and unreasonable
presumption of death resulting from absence for a brief period, would be
a want of due process of law, and therefore repugnant to the 14th Amendment. Let it be further conceded, as we also think is essential, that a state
law which did not provide adequate notice as prerequisite to the proceedings for the administration of the estate of an absentee would also be reugnant to the 14th Amendment. Again, let it be conceded that if a state
aw, in providing for the administration of the estate of an absentee, contained no adequate safeguards concerning property, and amounted, therefore, simply to authorizing the transfer of the property of the absentee to
others that such a law would be repugnant to the 14th Amendment. We
think none of these concessions are controlling in this case. So far as the
9eriod of absence provided by the statute in question, it certainly cannot
be said to be unreasonable. So far as the notices which it directs to be issued, we think they were reasonable. As concerns the safeguards which
the statute creates for the protection of the interest of the absentee in
case he should return, we content ourselves with saying that we think, as
construed -by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the provisions of the
statute do not conflict with the 14th Amendment."
Common Law Presumption of Death.
In Miller v. Beates"i there was an amicable action to recover certain legacies
by the plaintiffs under the will of George Schlosser, deceased, and in order to sustain their claim it was necessary to prove that John G. Schlosser was dead without
issue. It was proved on the part of the plaintiffs that John Schlosser went beyond
the sea, unmarried, many years before and the last that was heard of him was by
letter from himself to his father dated in France, November 24, 1802, in which he
mentioned that he should endeavor to get a passage to the United States and hoped
to be in Philadelphia the next summer. Efforts had been taken to ascertain whether
he had died in France but no evidence of his death could be obtained. The jury by
consent of the parties found for the plaintiff and it was agreed that there should
be a new trial unless the court should be of opinion that the evidence afforded
ground for a legal presumption of the death of John G. Schlosser. Tilghman, C.J.
explained:
16 3 S.&R. 490 (Pa. 1817).
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"The common law has fixed no period, after the expiration of which
death should be presumed. But there are two statutes in England, creating
a presumption in certain cases. By the statute punishing bigamy as a
felony, which does not extend to Pennsylvania, because it was made in the
first year of James I (before the grant to William Penn,) there is an exception in favour of persons, whose husbands, or wives, have been continually remaining in parts beyond sea, for seven years before the second
marriage, or who have been absent within the king's dominions for seven
years, without being known to be living within that time. And by the
statute of 19 Car. 2, c. 6, (which extends to Pennsylvania,) it is enacted,
that if any person or persons, for whose lives, estates are granted, absent
themselves for seven years together, and no evident proof be made of their
being living, in any action commenced by the lessors or reversioners, for
recovery of the premises, they shall be counted as dead. The Courts in England have adopted and extended the principle of these statutes to cases not
comprehended in them; to the case, for instance, of a person seised of
lands in fee simple, who has been absent beyond sea, without being heard
of, for seven years."
"I am not for fixing, at present, any precise period, after which a presumption of death arises. But I think myself safe in saying, that in the
present instance, considering, that fourteen years and nine months had
elapsed, between John G. Schlosser's being last heard of, and the commencement of this action; that when last heard of, he was at a place between which and the city of Philadelphia there was a free communication,
and it was then his intent to return soon to Philadelphia; his being now in
life, would be contrary to the usual course of things; that the jury might,
and ought to presume his death, and if the case were to come to another
trial, the court would so direct them. As to the injury 'tich might arise
to John G. Schlosser, by this presumption, in case he should be alive, I
think it ought not to be regarded. He would have his action against those
to whom the money will be paid; arid although he might lose by their insolvency, yet that would not be a greater evil than would arise from the
establishment of a principle, that the life of a man ought to be presumed,
under circumstances which usually attend death, merely because positive
proof of death could not be obtained. I am bound to mention, in justice
to the defendants, in this cause, that they have no wish to reap any benefit
from the detention of the money in question. Their object is safety; they
are willing to pay to the persons who are authorized by law to rec ive;
and, considering the circumstances of the case, I think they were prudent
in withholding the money, till the plaintiffs established their right by
legal adjudication."
1
Twenty-one years after Miller v. Beates, supra,1 6 the case of Burr v. Sim 7
came before'the court and it was held per Gibson, C. J., that the English rule of the
presumption of the continuance of life ceased at the end of seven yeats. Said the
Chief Justice:

16 See note 15.

17 4 Wharton 150 (Pa. 1838).
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"It certainly has not been expressly decided that the person must be
taken to have lived throughout the period; but that conclusion inevitably
follows from the legal presumption of life, which though prospectively
rebutted at a particular period, is sufficient to sustain an allegation of
existence during the time it lasted ......
In the case at bar, therefore,
we must say that it was an error in leaving the jury to presume the death
to have been at an intermediate period, unless we discover in the case at
least a spark of evidence that the individual was, at some particular date,
in contact with a specific peril as a circumstance to quicken the operation
of time. The circumstance relied upon is the departure of the individual
by sea; but the perils of the sea are general, not specific; and they are not
present but contingent. They are such as may or may not occur; but to accelerate the presumption from time, or more properly to turn it from an
artificial into a natural one, it is necessary to bring the presumption within
the range of a particular and an immediate danger-not such as is contingently incident, in some degree, to every mode of conveyance. A natural
presumption arises only from a violent probability, because it is a conclusion drawn by experience from the usual current of things; but no violent
probability of death arises from a peril, which, though possible, is remote."
Thus the judges finally evolved the law in the matter of the presumption of
death as follows:
(1) According to the common law of Pennsylvania a person whose disappearance is unexplained by any surrounding circumstances at the time of the
disappearance is presumed to continue in life for seven years after the date of the
disappearance.
(2) At the expiration of the seven-year period of unexplained absence the
presumption of life ceases and is supplanted by the presumption of death.
(3) Any circumstances of facts surrounding the disappearance which tend
to establish a reason why the person should absent himself will preclude the running of the seven-year period.
The late Professor James Bradley Thayer has ably presented the relation of
these presumptions and the law of evidence 18 and in his discussion relative to this
evolution in Pennsylvania it is stated:
"In Pennsylvania it is possible to put the finger on the very case that
accomplishedthis legislative stroke: the case of Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 140
In 1817 (citing Miller v. Beates, 3 S. & R. 490), the court laid
Sown the duty of a jury to presume death, without any positive proof of
it, when an unexplained absence for many years is shown; but they refused
to adopt a seven years' rule. 'I am not', said Tilghman, C.J., 'for fixing
any precise period after which a presumption of death arises. But here
fourteen years and nine months,' etc. In Burr v. Sim, however, the court
(Gibson, C.J.) adopted the English rule, although in Pennsylvania there
were no statutes like those in England; and they said: 'If there is no direct

S1839).

18 3 Harv. L. Rev. 154.
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decision, as there is in some of our States, it is because there has been no
case requiring it. There is such a case now, and the principle is to be considered as definitely settled.' In some states this rule, or the like, has been
fixed by statutes; but it is no less well established in others where it rests
not upon a statute, but a judicial determination." '19
The cases of Devlin v. The CommonweaLth, supra,20 and Scott v. McNeal,
supra,2 ' are illustrations of the ineffectiveness of the presumption as applied to
the estate of a presumed decedent where such presumption is rebutted by the fact
that the person presumed to be dead is actually alive and where the questions involved concern the distribution of the presumed decedents' estate.
To avoid this legal embarrassment the procedure under section 6 of the Fiduciaries Act2 2 should be followed, for as already pointed out the Cunnius case establishes constitutionally the specific jurisdiction of the orphans' court and the
register of wills in such cases.
However, the common law presumption is still applied where the facts do not
fall under Section 6 and these cases concern either the distribution of the estates
of actual decedents and where the orphans' court has jurisdiction under general
orphans' court law and also a class of cases involving life insurance problems particularly where beneficiaries under life policies are endeavoring to recover. These
latter cases are usually if not exclusively in the common pleas. Then there is another type of case where the common law presumption of death is not applicable
but on the contrary the fact of death is established by circumstantial evidence. A
short review of these different types is interesting.
Distributionof Estates
Singularly enough the first case in our annals where the matter of a presumption of death arose was Miller v. Beaters2 and the estate to be distributed was that
of an actual decedent and the plaintiffs were claiming certain legacies under the
will of this decedent, and the question to be determined was the death of a son
of the decedent who had disappeared fourteen years and nine months before. The
action was a common law one of which the court had undoubted jurisdiction. The
death was established through lapse of time and Tilghman, C.J. considered this
finding as final in the matter of the distribution of the estate of the father.
Likewise in Devlin v. The Commonwealth 24 the position of the respective
parties was substantially the same, but the son James Devlin, one of the distributees,
being actually dead, his share was allotted to his three children, one of whom, Mary,
was absent and unheard from for more than seven years. However, in this case
19 See also Missing Persons-Presumed Decedents-Act 8B of 1945, Fiduciary Review, Nov. 1945;
Act of April 10, 1945, P.L. 187; In re Millar's Estate, 356 Pa. 56, 51 A. 2d 745.
20 See note 4'
21 See note 6.
22 See note 8,
28 3 S.& R. 490 (Pa. 1817).

s4 101 Pa. 273 (1882).
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the estate of Mary was the subject of administration, the letters as granted being
based upon the presumpion of her death and the money which was due her from
the estate of the ancestor was voluntarily paid by her uncle, the cognizor, as due
on the recognizance bond given in the partition proceedings. If John F. Devlin,
the cognizor, had refused to pay and an action instituted on the bond, the common
law court having dear jurisdiction of the action, the defendant would have been
protected in the event of the death of Mary being established by the presumption.
In Whiteside's Appeal25 testator bequeathed five hundred dollars to his son
without interest until he called for the money and if he never called it was to be
paid to certain others after the death of the son. The son was heard from by letter
in 1837 but not afterwards. The will was made in 1840 and in the same year the
testator died. The son was presumed to be dead after seven years, that is in 1844,
and such presumption was not repelled by the idea that the testator by referring to
him in his will in 1840 may have supposed him to be alive at the time of making
of the will. It will be noted in this case the testator was actually dead, consequently
the orphans' court had undoubted jurisdiction and the money was eventually distributed as a part of this decedent's estate to the persons who would take in case
the son was dead. Therefore, his death having been established by the presumption
as occurring in 1844, the auditor properly distributed the money on a finding that
he was dead.' 6
In Appeal of Esterly'7 A was last heard of in May, 1870, at which time he
disappeared from home, leaving his wife and four children. His father died intestate
in March of 1879. The disappearance of A for seven years unexplained raised a
presumption of his death, and this presumption was as effective as direct proof of
the fact.
Consequently, as A was presumed to be dead at the time of his father's death,
his share of his father's estate went directly to his father's children as heirs, and the
creditors of A could not therefore participate in the distribution of this share. Said

Clark, J.:
"If it now appeared, by positive and direct proof, that Joseph H. Gery
had, in fact, diedon the day he disappeared, it certainly cannot be doubtel
that we would distribute this fund, so held in trust and awaiting adjudication, to those upon whom the estate devolved; and as the presumption of
death after the lapse of seven years is as effective as direct proof of the
fact, we cannot see how any doubt can exist as to the parties entitled here.
"It follows from what has been said that the appellants are entitled as
heirs of their grandfather, and not as the heirs of their father, and that
R. B. Longaker & Son, as creditors of the father, cannot therefore participate in the fund."' 8
25 23 Pa. 114 (1854).
26 Cf. Campbell v. Reed, 24 Pa. 498 (1855), and the question whether the presumed decedent
died with or without issue. See also Miller v. Beates, 3 S. & R. 490 (Pa. 1817). Cf. Fiduciary Review,
Nov. 1945.
27 109 Pa. 222 (1885).

2S See Francis v. Francis, 180 Pa. 644, 37 A. 120 (1897), giving rule as to when the presump-

tion of death begins.
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In Freeman'sEstate29 a son of decedent had been absent and unheard of for
more than seven years after his father's death, but there was evidence that he had
been heard of within three or four years prior to his father's death. Held, that a
finding of the orphans' court that the son survived the father will not be reversed.
In such a case the son's share of the personal estate of the father may be distributed
directly to the personal representative of his mother, the orphans' court of Philadelphia County stating:
"Ordinarily the share of Darwin Freeman would be paid to an administrator of his estate. Under existing circumstances it will be distributed
directly to those entitled as by way of intestacy. The distribution directed
by the auditing judge is to this extent modified, and the share of Darwin
awarded to the estate of his mother, the widow of the testator, security
being first required to protect the possible interest of the missing son or
his legal representatives." 3 0
In Woodside's Estate3 it was held proper in making distribution of the estate
of the decedent, there having been found as a fact the death of certain heirs by
applying the presumption where they had been unheard from for periods of twentynine and eighteen years respectively, to award the fund to the remaining heirs upon
their giving bond for the repayment of the shares of the presumed decedents if it
should be subsequently ascertained that they were alive at the time of decedent's
death, and holding it unnecessary to resort to the method provided by Section 6 of
the Fiduciaries Act to establish the presumption of death of such absentees. The court
stipulated as follows:
"The fund in his case will be distributed among the eleven cousins
named in the audit statement, subject to assignments and attachments; but
each distributee shall file his own bond without sureties in double the
amount of the portion of the presumed decedents' shares which each one
receives, conditioned that if either or both of said presumed decedents
were alive on Aug. 27, 1928, such amounts received will, on demand, be
refunded to said presumed decedents or their legal representatives."
In Maley v. Pa. R. R. Co.32 the entire subject under discussion was reviewed
by Frazer, J. in affirming the judgments of the court below in an action of assumpsit
for funds deposited with the defendant by plaintiff's decedent, and the facts and
conclusions were summarized as follows:
"Martin Maley died in 1913, leaving a will in which, after giving certain specific legacies, he left his residuary estate to his wife, plaintiff in this
proceeding, and appointed her executrix. Deceased had been an employee
of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the defendant, and had, since
29 227 Pa. 154, 73 A.

1063 (1910). Cf. Young v. Sweigert, 69 Pa. Super. 525 (1918),

that

the presumption of life continues until the expiration of seven years.
80 See Baker v. Fidelity Title and Trust Co., 55 Pa. Super. 15 (1913), awarding in partition
proceedings the interest-on a portion of the fund for life to the widow of the presumed decedent.
Nothing is said but security was probably required.
81 14 D. & C. 34 (1929), per Chalfont, J., of the O.C. of Allegheny County. MacFarlan's Est.,
267 Pa. 510, 111 A. 444 (1920).
82 258 Pa. 73, 101 A. 911 (1917).
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1893, made deposits in the employees' saving fund of the company, and,
at the time of his death, there was standing to his credit in that fund the
sum-of $1,774.25, the subject-matter of this litigation. In his application
for membership deceased provided that, in event of his death, the amount
due him should be paid to his three children, Jerry, Daniel and Mary, or,
in case they were not living, to his legal representatives. The regulations
governing payment of the saving fund provided that 'Upon the presentation to the superintendent of the fund of satisfactory proof of the death of
a depositor, the money belonging to him shall be paid only to the beneficiary designated, in accordance with these regulations, to receive the
same; or, if the beneficiary so designated shall not be then living, said fund
shall be paid either to the heirs or legal representatives of the deceased
depositor, as the board, or superintendent, may determine.' Daniel and
Jerry Maley left home shortly after the father became a depositor to this
fund and have not since been heard from. After the death of Martin
Maley, Mary assigned her interest in the fund to her mother, the executrix,
who then brought this action to recover the entire fund as the personal
representative of decedent, basing her claim to the shares of Jerry and
Daniel on the presumption of their death, arising from absence unheard of
for a period of twenty-one and eighteen years respectively at the time of
bringing this action. The court below left to the jury the question whether
the absent sons were dead, and a verdict for plaintiff was rendered on
which the court, after discharging rules for a new trial and judgment non
obstante veredicto, entered judgment, and defendant appealed."
The jurisdiction of the court of common pleas to adjudicate the fact of the
death of the two sons was sustained, the learned justice discussing the Act of 1885
and the cases referred to in the same present artide, stating:
"We find nothing in the act, however, indicating an intention on the
part of the legislature to confer upon the orphans' court exclusive jurisdiction of the determination of the fact of death by reason of absence....
Defendant cannot be injured by a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for
the amount in its hands. It admits the amount is due and merely desires to
be protected in making payment to the proper person. This protection is
fully given by the judgment of the court in the present proceeding."
lnsrance Cases
The insurance cases likewise afford some interesting applications of the presumption of death doctrine. A typical and well-considered one is Gronerv. Knights
o/ Maccabeesss wherein, in an action in the common pleas by a wife to recover
insurance on the life of her husband whose death was alleged, it was held that the
rule that in case of an absent person of whom no tidings had been received, the
presumption of the continuance of life ceased at the end of seven years and a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff will be sustained where the evidence showed
a8 265 Pa. 129, 108 A. 437 (1919). Accord, Roblin v. Knights of Maccabees, 269 Pa. 139, 112

A. 70 (1920). As the presumption of death cannot be established until the end of the 7-year period,
assessments of premiums due upon beneficial certificates or policies must be paid until the end of
the period, otherwise the insurance may lapse. Schoneman's Appeal. 174 Pa. 1, 34 A. 283; on this

ltt point also see the Roblin case, ra ba.
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that the insured had lived for twelve years with his wife in a "pleasant" home
which he had built; that he had two children; that his parents who were advanced
in years, and many friends, lived in the same town; that in November, 1907, when
his health was poor, he left home, with the intention of going to Oklahoma to
work at his trade; that his wife accompanied him part of the way; that after she
left him he mailed letters to her all along his route, and some from Oklahoma;
that running out of funds he wrote to his wife and she sent him money; that he
subsequently sent a check to his daughter from California; that in 1909 he wrote
from a town in California that he was getting his teeth fixed; that thereafter no
communication was received from him; that the wife made numerous inquiries
for him, writing to machine shops, to public officers of towns where such shops
existed, and to people, who she thought might know of his whereabouts; that her
brother-in-law went on a trip to find him; that she advertised in a trade journal,
offering a reward for information about his whereabouts, and that all her efforts
to locate him had failed; and more than seven years after last hearing from him
suit was brought.
The opinion by Moschzisker, J., reviews the entire line of cases establishing
and applying the presumption of death Mxle.
In Sheak v. New York Life Ins. Co. 84, an action on a life policy, evidence that
insured left home to obtain work and was unheard of for seven years, notwithstanding inquiries by his mother and wife, the latter after five years obtaining a divorce
on the ground of desertion, warranted the jury in presuming death and hence the
wife could recover on the policy. Further it was declared that testimony by the
insurance company that within seven years a man giving insured's name attempted
to make a long distance telephone call to his mother had little if any probative
value, and in any event insurer could not complain where such testimony, brought
out by it, was admitted and jury was instructed that if call came from insured
within seven years the plaintiff could not recover. In re-affirming the general nile,
Baldridge, P.J,, said:
"Recently, in McNulty v. General American Life Ins. Co., 153 Pa.
Super. 288, 291, 292, 33 A. 2d. 796, 798, we reiterated the general rule
that when one's absence is unexplained and he is unheard of for seven
years, there arises a presumption of death, and unless overcome the
amount due under a life insurance policy is due and payable. Any fact
which fairly and reasonably tends to rebut the presumption is admissible.
The presumption of death naturally depends upon the circumstances in
each case. The sufficiency of the evidence to rebut the presumption once it
is shown to exist, is a question of law. Wigmore, Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. IX, section 2531b, p. 473. The truth, however, of plaintiff's
evidence, upon which the presumption of death is predicated, and every
inference fairly deductible therefrom must be assumed by the court in
84 157 Pa. Super. 219, 42 A. 2d 192 (1945).
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determining that question. Gurnacki v. Polish Roman Catholic Union,
113 Pa. Super. 189, 192, 193, 172 A. 48 0 ."s6
Direct Proof of Death
The common and usual way of proving the death of a deceased owner of
property is by the testimony of those who saw him die and can testify directly to
that fact. Such evidence may be furnished by physicians in attendance or friends
and relatives acquainted with the facts. In given cases the testimony of the under-

taker or of those who attended the funeral and were acquainted with the decedent
in his lifetime may be taken as sufficient.
In other words, in instances where death is a notorious fact any persons
familiar with that fact may testify before the register of wills if such persons are
otherwise competent witnesses.
CircumstancialEvidence of Death
In contrast with the usual situation as outlined in the previous paragraph,
the fact of death may not be the subject of direct proof, as for example where one
was last seen in a burning building or on a sinking vessel or in some other situation of great peril and following these events the individual in question has disappeared and his whereabouts are unknown.
Some years ago a prominent citizen of Pennsylvania suffering from a severe
nervous breakdown was last seen on the extreme end of a pier at Atlantic City.
Later his hat, overcoat and cane were found near the place of his last appearance.

He was never afterwards heard from or his whereabouts accounted for.
In such instances there is an absence of the finding of a body which might
be the subject of identification. Yet in these respective cases and on the evidence as
submitted, any reasonable time after the disappearance the register of wills would
be justified in finding the fact of death and granting letters upon the estate of the
given person.
In short, any circumstances submitted as evidence from which the register of
wills might reasonably draw the inference of death would be sufficient proof to
authorize the issuance of letters of administration or to probate a will in case of
testacy. Of course, the finding of fact by the register of wills under such circumstances would be the subject of appeal to the orphans' court and might result in
the fratning of an issue and the determination of the fact by a jury trial.
Curiously enough this very question of proving death by circumstancial evidence rather than awaiting the 7-year period until proving the same by application
of the presumption of death arose in Burr v. Sim' wherein the presumption of
s5 Accord, Jaskalski v. Catholic Union, 64 Pa. Super. 535 (1916) ; Young v. Sweigert, 69 Pa.
Super 525 (1918); O'Hara v. Ins. Co., 73 Pa. Super 434 (1920); Elliott v. Ins. Co., 75 Pa. Super
534 (1921); Grunda v. B. & L. Assn., 128 Pa. Super. 604, 194 A. 797 (1937); Ryan v. Ins. Co.,
135 Pa. Super. 166, 4 A. 2d 812 (1939); Sharpe v. The Co., 144 Pa. Super. 231, 19 A. 2d 509

(1941).
Of4 WbLrton 15o (PL 1838).
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death on the expiration of the 7-year period was adopted by our court. Said Gibson,

C.J.:

"In the case at bar, therefore, we must say there was an error in leaving
the jury to presume the death to have been at an intermediate period,
unless we discover in the case at least a spark of evidence that the individual was, at some particular date, in contact with a specific peril as a
circumstance to quicken the operation of time. The circumstance relied
on, is the departure of the individual by sea; but the perils of the sea are
general, not specific; and they are not present but contingent. They are
such as may or may not occur; but to accelerate the presumption from
time, or more properly to turn it from an artificial into a natural one, it is
necessary to bring the person within the range of a particular and an immediate danger-not such as is contingently incident, in some degree, to
every mode of conveyance. A natural presumption arises only from a violent probability, because it is a conclusion drawn by experience from the
usual current of things; but no violent probability
of death arises from a
7
peril, which, though possible, is remote."3
Several of our cases illustrate the application of the specific peril doctrine and
as to the nature and the amount of evidence to justify the finding of death by the
trier of the fact. In Fanning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, a8 there was an
unexplained absence of more than seven years which the insurance company, defendant, admitted, but contended that under the facts the presumption of death
did not arise until the expiration of the seven years from time of disappearance,
but it was held that although the time of the death of the person who cannot
be found is presumed to be seven years from the date on which he was last heard
from, the presumption of life in the interim may be overcome by facts and circumstances tending to show that his death probably happened sooner, as that he encountered a special peril which might reasonably be expected to destroy life. It
was held accordingly that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that the
insured died in a forest fire where it appeared that up until that time he wrote
frequently to his mother, sending her money, that he earned good wages and was
without financial difficulties and had a happy cheerful disposition, and that when
last seen and heard of he said that he was going to fight the forest fire, in which
many persons lost their lives, some being burned beyond recognition.
In Herold v. Washington Natl. Ins. Co.,8 9 there was a suit to recover on an
accident policy for the death of her husband by Laura H. Herold. Verdict for
plaintiff and from the judgment entered defendant appealed.
About 4:30 P.M. on July 7, 1935, insured was last seen swimming in the
ocean in front of the President Hotel, Atlantic City, where two lifeguards were on
duty. The testimony showed that insured was never seen to come ashore nor seen
elsewhere thereafter.
87 Emphasis supplied by the present writer.

88 264 Pa. 333, 107 A. 715(1919).
89 128 Pa. Super. 563, 194 A. 687 (1937).
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In affirming the judgment the Superior Court, per curiam, explained, inter
alia:
"Circumstances, tending to show that the insured was subjected to
specific peril or serious danger on the day he was last seen or heard of;
were given in evidence which, if believed by the jury, were sufficient, in
our opinion, to support a finding that he was accidentally drowned on
July 7, 1935, although his body was not recovered. In that event, it was
not necessary to wait seven years before bringing suit, and the case was
one of fact for the jury. The decisions of our Supreme Court and of this
court, relied on by appellant, are easily distinguishable. They relate to cases

where satisfactory ind sufficient evidence that the insured had been subjcted to serious peril of a nature that might prevent the recovery of the
dy was lacking, or the beneficiary elected to rely on the presumption
of death arising seven years after the unexplained disappearance of the
insured rather than attempt to prove that the latter died on a certain
date within the seven years."
Resume

This review of the leading cases on the present topic presents five classes:
(1) where as in Devlin v. Commonwealth, supra, the estate of a decedent is administered, the fact of death being based on the presumption; (2) where as in
Freeman's Estate, supra, and others, the estate of a decedent is being distributed
and the fact of the death of a proposed distributee is based upon presumption;
(3) where the estate of one is being administered, the fact of his death being based
upon circumstancial evidence; (4) the insurance cases where there is a suit brought
to recover on a policy of the insured whose death is proved by circumstancial evidence; and (5) where in the insurance cases as outlined in (4) the fact of death
of the insured is based upon the presumption.

Finality of Decree of ludgment.
The legal vice of Devlin v. Commonwealth0 and Scott v. McNeal'1 was that,
according to the ruling on the facts as they eventually turned out, the respective
courts were without jurisdiction in the premises. According to the theory they essayed to administer the estates of persons who were not dead and thus transcended
their jurisdictional powers. However, this conclusion although supported by authority42 is sound legal reasoning or otherwise depending upon the acceptance of
the major premise in the syllogism of logic. It might have been urged that each
court had jurisdiction from the finding of the fact of death and that this jurisdiction
could not be destroyed by later fortuitous circumstances. In other words, once the
jurisdiction was established by the finding of the court, that was conclusive.
,
However, the Act of 1885 and its successor, Section 6 of the Fiduciaries Act,
were enacted to cure this matter and to specifically confer jurisdiction upon the
40 See note 4.

41 See note 6.
4ZSee opinion of Gray, J., in Scott v. McNeal, 14 Sup. Ct. 1108 (May 14, 1894) 38 Law. Ed.
896.
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orphans' courts and registers of wills in the presumed decedent cases. This has been
accomplished.
Nevertheless, where any court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and uses
in the finding of some fact the presumption of death, a decree or judgment entered
by such court upon the controversy involved is considered final, even though later
the presumption may be found incorrect. 48 Furthermore, in the Maley Case, Franzer,
J. pointed out the protective feature of the judgment, observing:
"Defendant cannot be injured by a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
for the amount in its hands. It admits the amount is due and merely desires to be protected in making payment to the proper person. This protection is fully given by the judgment of the court in the present proceeding. In Devlin v. Commonwealth to use, 101 Pa. 273, this court held a
voluntary payment to the administrator, appointed on the estate of a person on the strength of the presumption of death before the Act of 1886,
was not a defense to a subsequent action by the supposed decedent, but
said (Page 278): 'Had John F. Devlin been compelled, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, to have paid to the administrator the money in
controversy, his case would have been very different.' In Miller et al vs.
Beates, et al., 3 S. & R. 49o, it was said in answer to a similar contention
(page 494) : 'As to the injury which might arise to John G. Schlosser, by
this presumption, in case he should be alive, I think it ought not be regarded. He would have his action against those to whom the money will be
paid; and although he might lose by their insolvency, yet that would not be
a greater evil than would arise from the establishment of a principle that
the life of a man ought to be presumed, under circumstances which usually
attend death, merely because positive proof of death could not be obtained. I am bound to mention, in justice to the defendants, in this cause,
that they have no wish to reap any benefit from the detention of the money
in question. Their object is safety; they are willing to pay to the persons
who are authorized by law to receive; and, considering the circumstances
of the case, I think they were prudent in withholding the money, till the
plaintiff established their right by legal adjudication."
Duty to Refund
Applying the principle of Devlin v. The Commonwealth, supra, and Scott v.
McNeal, supra, as the proceedings of administration of the estate of the presumed
decedent are null and void, no one is protected in dealing with the personal representative or the orphans' court, hence there is no legal protection to personal
representative, creditor, purchaser or distributee when the presumed decedent returns and hence he is entitled to the restoration of his property despite the passage
of time.
This impossible situation was remedied in large part by the Act of 1885 and
now by Section 6 of the Fiduciaries Act. However, despite the theory that the ad48 Maley v. Pa, R.R. Co., 258 Pa. 373, 101 A. 911 (1917).
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ministration proceedings are in rem, Section 6 preserves a right in personam against
the innocent distributee and in most instances protects this right of recovery by a
bond, sometimes with approved sureties and at others without, depending upon
the view the orphans' court takes on the lapse of time.
On the other hand in the type of cases illustrated by Freeman'sEstatie, supra,
and others where the estate of an actual decedent is being distributed and the fact
of the death of a proposed distributee is based upon the presumption, the early
decisions awarded the fund to other parties based upon the presumption of death
and no bond was required, but the inference was that if the presumed decedent
returned he had a right of recovery against the distributee despite the solemn adjudication of the court in the matter of the distribution. The cases on this branch
of our subject arising after the Act of 1885 apparently suggested to the orphans'
courts the expediency of requiring a bond of the distributee either with or without sureties. On what actual statutory basis such an order is supported is not quite
clear, except by way of analogy to proceedings under the Act of 1885 or the present Section 6. No cases have been encountered where actual restitution occurred.
In the present state of the law the cases where the fact of death is based upon
circumstancial evidence are embraced under the general principle of the Devlin
case, however unhappy the result proves to be.
In contrast with the aforegoing conclusions, the insurance cases, either where
the suit brought to recover on a policy of the insured whose death is proved by
circumstancial evidence or by the finding of the fact of death of the insured as
based upon the presumption, hold that the decree or judgment of the court is final.
Query, has the insured or the insurance company, in case of the return of the presumed insured decedent, a right to recover the proceeds of the policy from the
beneficiary or distributees? No cases have been encountered in this study furnishing
an adequate or satisfying answer, although it is perfectly dear from the decisions
that the insurance company is fully protected in paying out in accordance with the
decree or judgment as rendered.
Conclusion

The aforegoing review indicates that the particular law as it pertains to the
orphans' court is unsatisfactory and as compared with the results in the common
pleas on the same topic is inconsistent notably in the matter of the duty to refund.
The case for a presumed decedent returning and demanding his property is not
an impressive one under the usual circumstances. In fact the case is usually much
stronger for an innocent heir or distributee who is compelled by law to refund
possibly after the passage of many years when the economic conditions generally
and applying to the individual particularly might render such action extremely
harsh. In the instance of real estate, the principle of refunding involves the impracticability of holding the same indefinitely and with no incentive to improve
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or the risk of selling and giving a bond for the purchase money with the risk of
the bond eventually becoming due and payable by the return of the presumed
decedent. In either aspect the results are socially undesirable and the law should
be changed, making the final action of the orphans' court in the matter of distribution or the vesting of estate conclusive, possibly refraining from this final step
until every reasonable effort has been exhausted to ascertain the whereabouts of
the absentee, thus assuring every compliance with the requirement of due process
of law under the constitutional limitations.

